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This paper measures the extent to which destination resort casinos export bankruptcy back to 
visitors’ home states.  Previous literature has alluded to this possibility, but to date studies have 
only examined the influence of local casinos on local bankruptcy.   Using various survey data, 
we calculate the number of visits from each state to casino resort destinations in Nevada, New 
Jersey, and Mississippi.  We find strong evidence that states having more residents who visit 
out-of-state casino resorts have higher bankruptcy filings.  This effect is dominant in the south, 




* The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System.  Molly D. Castelazo and 
Lesli Ott provided research assistance. 
 Do Casinos Export Bankruptcy? 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
  Casino gambling has now established itself as a major economic and social presence in 
the United States.  Commercial casino gambling is available in 11 states and Native American 
casinos are present in 23 states.
1  In 2003, adjusted gross revenue from commercial and Native 
American casinos totaled nearly $44 billion, or nearly 60 percent of all gambling revenues in 
the United States (Christiansen, 2003).
2   Thirty-eight percent of U.S. casino revenue was 
generated from three jurisdictions: Nevada ($9.6 billion), Atlantic City, New Jersey ($4.5 
billion), and Mississippi ($2.7 billion).
3     
  Casinos in Nevada, New Jersey, and Mississippi are predominately tourist destinations, 
or what Eadington (1998) has termed “destination resort casinos.”  These destination resorts are 
characterized by the presence of multiple casinos, thousands of hotel rooms, gourmet 
restaurants, multi-day stays by visitors, and other amenities typical of a vacation resort, such as 
spas, golf courses, and nightclubs.  Clearly, the casino resorts in Nevada, New Jersey, and 
Mississippi differ from others areas of the country, such as small Native American and 
commercial casinos in the Midwest, which draw gamblers mostly from the local community 
and offer a less formal gambling environment. 
Visits to these destination resort casinos are not trivial.  For example, according to the 
Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority, 35.5 million people visited Las Vegas in 2003 
                                                 
1 Commercial casinos refer to casinos owned by publicly traded corporations. 
2 Available at http://www.grossannualwager.com/.  Adjusted gross casino revenue is equal to total wagers minus 
player winnings.  Other sources of gambling revenue include state lotteries, pari-mutuel racing, and racinos 
(gaming devices located at pari-mutuel tracks). 
3 Revenue figures were gathered from various gaming control board websites.  For an excellent centralized source 
of casino revenue data, see the UNLV Gaming Studies Research Center at 
http://gaming.unlv.edu/resources/statistics/revenue.html. 
  2and spent $32.7 billion dollars.  Forty-percent of these visitors lived outside the western United 
States, and 30 percent of visitors to Las Vegas were from California.  Reno had 4.8 million 
visitors in 2003, with 44 percent visiting from California and 7 percent visiting from both 
Oregon and Washington.  Laughlin, Nevada had approximately 4.3 million visitors in 2003, 
with 40 percent originating from California and 23 percent from Arizona.  The Atlantic City 
Convention and Visitors Authority reports that 32.3 million people visited Atlantic City in 
2003.  According to the New Jersey Division of Tourism, nearly 64 percent of all tourist visits 
to New Jersey, including visits to casinos, are from out-of-state.  The Mississippi Gulf Coast 
Convention and Visitors Bureau estimates that 78 percent of Gulf coast gaming revenue is 
generated from out-of-state visitors, and the Mississippi Gaming Commission reports that, on 
average, only 33 percent of visitors to Mississippi resort casinos live in the state of 
Mississippi.
4
  Destination resort casinos create the greatest number of jobs, tax revenue and other 
economic benefits (Eadington, 1998, 1999).  By attracting visitors from outside of the region, 
destination resort casinos effectively export gambling services to those regions where tourists 
originate.  While these casinos provide entertainment for millions of visitors who contribute to 
the local and state economies, an interesting question is the extent to which various problems 
associated with casino gambling, such as bankruptcy and addiction, are also exported to the 
regions where tourists live.  Barron et al. (2002) note the possibility that a destination resort 
                                                 
4 Data for Las Vegas are from http://www.lasvegas24hours.com/pdf/historical_visitor_statistics.pdf.  Reno data are 
from the 2003 Marketing Report, available at http://www.visitrenotahoe.com/about/2003marketingreport.pdf.  
Laughlin data are from http://www.lasvegas24hours.com/press/laughlin_profile.html.  Atlantic City and New 
Jersey data are from http://www.atlanticcitynj.com/resources_research.asp and 
http://www.state.nj.us/travel/industry/research.shtml. Information for Mississippi is from the Mississippi Gaming 
Commission (http://www.mgc.state.ms.us) and “Fiscal Year 2003 Economic Impact for Tourism in Mississippi,” 
available at http://www.visitmississippi.org/press_news/Total_fy03_TR_report.pdf.  Both Nevada and Mississippi 
also have Native American casinos, but none qualify as a destination resort casino based on the definition by 
Eadington (1998). 
  3casino may be a net exporter of ‘negatives’ given the fact that many of its patrons are tourists 
who take their problems, including financial losses, home with them.   
This paper attempts to quantify the extent to which destination resort casinos export 
negatives back to a visitor’s home state.  Specifically, we explore the influence that out-of-state 
visits to destination resort casinos have on personal bankruptcy rates in visitors’ home states. 
 
II.   Personal Bankruptcy and Casino Gambling 
   The number of personal bankruptcy filings in the United States increased about 126 
percent between 1990 and 2004, from just over 700,000 in 1990 to nearly 1.6 million in 2004.  
Figure 1 demonstrates this rising trend in personal bankruptcy filings, despite declines in 1993 
and 1994 as well as 1999, 2000, and 2004. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
  Various social, economic, and demographic factors have been hypothesized to 
contribute to the growing number of personal bankruptcies.  These factors include rising debt 
levels and easier access to credit (Shephard, 1984a; Domowitz and Sartain, 1999), higher 
divorce rates (Shephard, 1984a; Heck, 1981), changes to bankruptcy laws (Shephard, 1984b; 
Boyes and Faith, 1986), changes in economic conditions (Eckstein and Sinai, 1986; Domowitz 
and Eovaldi, 1993), and a decreased social stigma attached to bankruptcy (Sullivan et al., 1988, 
1989). 
  The simultaneous spread of casino gambling and rising bankruptcy rates in the 1990s 
has been noted and studied for evidence of a causal relationship.  Research has provided mixed 
results.  The Treasury Department (1999), using data from 1962 to 1998 and applying an 
intervention model, found no measurable effect of gambling on personal bankruptcy rates in 
  4Mississippi and New Jersey.  Expanding on the study performed by the Treasury Department, 
de la Vina and Bernstein (2002) examined county level bankruptcy rates for the years 1988 to 
1996.  After controlling for county-level fixed effects and the unemployment rate, the authors 
found no significant relationship between casino gambling available within 50 miles and 
personal bankruptcy filings. 
  Thalheimer and Ali (2004) examined personal bankruptcy rates over the period 1990 to 
1997 in the riverboat gambling states of Iowa, Illinois, Missouri, and Mississippi.  Controlling 
for various social, economic, and legal factors, the authors found that access to casino gambling 
had no significant influence on personal bankruptcies.  However, Thalheimer and Ali (2004) 
estimated that personal bankruptcy rates, on average, would have been 0.4 percent lower in the 
absence of casino gambling. 
    Nichols et al. (2000) used a difference-in-difference methodology to compare 
bankruptcy rates in eight communities that adopted casino gambling during the 1990s with a 
group of control communities, matched by a set of fifteen economic and demographic 
characteristics.  Bankruptcy rates in seven casino communities were higher than their matched 
group of control communities after the casino opened, but only five of the seven cases were 
statistically significant.  In one community studied, Biloxi, Mississippi, bankruptcy rates were 
lower after the casinos opened, but this change in bankruptcy was not statistically significant. 
  Evans and Topoleski (2002) used a difference-in-difference methodology similar to 
Nichols et al. (2000) to examine the influence of Native American casinos on surrounding 
communities.  Counties with Native American casinos and counties within fifty miles of a 
  5Native American casino were compared to non-gaming counties between 1989 and 1999.
5  
Evans and Topoleski (2002) found that personal bankruptcies significantly increased by 10 
percent in counties with Native American casinos and 7 percent in counties within fifty miles 
of a casino four years after the casino opened.  However, the authors noted that while this 
increase was large, it accounted for only a small percentage of the total increase in personal 
bankruptcies over the last fifteen years. 
  A recent paper by Barron et al. (2002) echoes the local, but small, aggregate influence 
of casino gambling on bankruptcy.  Using county-level data for the period 1993 to 1999 and 
controlling for numerous economic and socio-demographic factors, such as the level of 
consumer debt, income, job tenure, divorce rates, health insurance coverage, and wage 
garnishing laws, Barron et al. (2002) found that casino gambling had a positive and significant 
influence on personal bankruptcy.  They noted that without gambling, counties with or adjacent 
to casinos would have had bankruptcy rates that were 5.4 percent lower in 1998.  Nationwide, 
however, the reduction in bankruptcies would have only been 1 percent. 
  All of the above studies examined the localized influence of casino gambling.  That is, 
they explored the influence of local casino gambling on local bankruptcies.  No study to date 
has explored the influence that destination casino resorts such as those in Nevada, New Jersey, 
and Mississippi have on bankruptcy filings for individuals living in communities across the 
country that visit these resorts.  As noted by Barron et al. (2002, page 454), “it is certainly 
possible and perhaps likely that some of the ill effects of casino gambling are exported back to 
the counties where tourists reside.” 
                                                 
5  Excluded from the analysis were states with no Native American owned casinos (New Jersey, Delaware, Illinois, 
Indiana, Missouri, and West Virginia), states with Native American and non-Native American owned 
establishments (Colorado, Iowa, Mississippi, Nevada, and South Dakota), and Oklahoma. 
  6III.   Data and Hypotheses 
  The main focus of this paper is to test the hypothesis that visits to destination resort 
casinos in Nevada, New Jersey, and Mississippi increase bankruptcy rates in the states where 
tourists to these casino resorts reside.  We also explore whether bankruptcy rates in the three 
casino resort states are higher than other states, both nationally and regionally.  As noted in 
Eadington (1998), casino gambling may lead to an increase in local bankruptcies, or 
conversely, it may reduce bankruptcies via an increase in economic growth resulting from 
casino gambling.  We obtain state-level non-business bankruptcy filing data (Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 13) for the 48 contiguous states for the years 2001 and 2002.  These data are available 
from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.   
 
Casino Visits and Availability 
Our variable of interest is the per capita number of visits from each state to the three 
casino resort states of Nevada, New Jersey, and Mississippi.  Data were obtained from the 2002 
and 2003 Profile of the American Casino Gambler: Harrah’s Survey to calculate the number of 
visits from each state to Nevada resort casinos and New Jersey resort casinos.  Data were 
obtained from the Mississippi Gaming Commission to calculate the number of visits from each 
state to Mississippi resort casinos.
6  The casino resort destinations in each state are:  Nevada - 
                                                 
6 The Harrah’s Survey is based on surveys conducted by Roper Reports and NFO WorldGroup.  Roper conducted 
face-to-face interviews of 2,000 men and women.  NFO WorldGroup mailed a survey questionnaire to 100,000 
adults and 3,300 adults who were pre-identified as gamblers.  These surveys are done annually.  The latest 
Harrah’s Survey (2004) does not report the percentage of all visits to casino destinations, making our calculation 
of per capita visits impossible. Current and past surveys are available from Harrah’s at 
http://www.harrahs.com/about_us/index.html.  Quarterly visitation reports for Mississippi casinos are available at 
http://www.mgc.state.ms.us/.   Data from these quarterly reports were summed to arrive at annual totals for 2001 
and 2002. 
  7Reno, Las Vegas, Laughlin, and Lake Tahoe; New Jersey - Atlantic City; and Mississippi - 
Tunica and the Gulf coast.
7
For calendar years 2001 and 2002, the 2002 and 2003 Harrah’s Survey lists the number 
of “gambling trips” (the number of gamblers times the number of casino visits) made by 
residents in each state and the percentage of these gambling trips that were made to casino 
resorts in Nevada and New Jersey (as well as other gambling locations).  Similarly, the 
Mississippi Gaming commission reports the number of trips made from each state to 
Mississippi resort casinos as well as the total number of visits to Mississippi casinos.   
Using the information obtained by the Harrah’s Survey and the Mississippi Gaming 
Commission, we calculated per capita visits to each casino resort state i, from state j as 
PCVISITi,j = {(GamblingTripsj) x (PercentVisitsi,j)}/POPj, where GamblingTripsj is the number 
of casino trips made by residents of state j, PercentVisitsi,j is the percentage of gambling trips to 
a casino resort state i from state j, and POPj is the population of state j.
8  For the three resort 
states, PCVISIT = 0.
9  If, as suggested by Barron et al. (2002) and others that visitors to 
destination resort casinos take their problems home with them, we would expect higher 
bankruptcy rates in states that have a greater number of per capita visits to these casino 
destinations.  
                                                 
7 Classification as a casino resort is done by authors and is based on the definition of a destination casino resort 
stated by Eadington (1998). 
8 Several points: (1) If Nevada’s resort casinos accounted for less than three percent of a state’s total casino visits, 
no visitation data was reported in the Harrah’s Survey.  As a result, 2002 visitations to Nevada from Arkansas, 
Louisiana, Missouri, Mississippi, Maine, Montana, Vermont, Tennessee, and Wyoming were obtained from airline 
data compiled by the Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority (www.lvcva.com).  (2)  Visits to Nevada in 
2001 from Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Vermont, and Wyoming use 2002 airline data compiled by the 
Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority.  (3) Visits to Mississippi from Kentucky, South Carolina, and 
Virginia for 2001 and 2002 are from the Harrah’s Survey.  The Mississippi Gaming Commission did not report 
visits from these states, listing visits from these states in an ‘other’ category. 
9 This is to ensure that the out-of-state, or exported, externality is the primary effect captured by PCVISIT.  
Residents of Nevada, Mississippi, and New Jersey clearly gamble in their respective states, however, so our 
empirical models include other variables that capture the localized influence of casino gambling on local 
bankruptcy filings. 
  8  Given that gambling is widespread across the United States, it is critical to control for 
the extent of casino gambling in the state where the tourists reside in order to determine the net 
effect that visits to our chosen destinations have on personal bankruptcy.  We use data on total 
casino gaming revenue, including both commercial and Native American, for each state in 
2001 and 2002 as a measure of casino presence.
10  Commercial casino revenue is available 
publicly from the various state gaming agencies.  Casino revenue figures for Native American 
casinos, however, are generally not available due to the sovereign status of Native American 
tribes.  Therefore, we use a unique set of state-specific estimates provided by Meister (2005).   
The expected influence of casino gambling on same-state personal bankruptcy filings is 
ambiguous.  The literature reviewed above offers mixed results, with some studies finding that 
casino gambling causes bankruptcy rates to rise while others find no effect.  Based on past 
literature, we anticipate that states with a greater presence of casino gambling may have a 
higher, but possibly only marginally so, incidence of personal bankruptcy filings. 
 
Economic and Demographic Controls  
  According to the Consumer Federation of America, income shocks such as divorce, 
unemployment, or medical expenses, are greater contributors to bankruptcy than a profligate 
lifestyle (Burke, 1998).  Shephard (1984a, page 217) notes that “[bankruptcy] petitioners are 
more apt to be unemployed, recently divorced, members of racial minorities and heavy users of 
credit.”  As a result, several variables are included in our empirical models to control for these 
income shocks. 
                                                 
10 Revenue data from racinos (casinos at pari-mutuel tracks) is also included in total gaming revenue.  Racino 
states include Delaware, Iowa, Louisiana, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and West Virginia.  Some of these racinos 
(e.g. Delaware and West Virginia) are part of the state’s lottery. 
  9  We include state-level per capita income to control for variations in income levels 
across states.  Greater per capita income, an indicator of greater asset levels and also a key 
component of net debt, is expected to reduce per capita bankruptcy.
11  To account for income 
shocks such as medical expenses, divorce, or job loss, we include the state unemployment rate, 
divorce rate per thousand people, and the percent of the population with privately or publicly 
provided health insurance coverage.
12  States with higher rates of divorce and unemployment 
are expected to have higher bankruptcy rates, whereas states having a higher percentage of their 
population covered by health insurance are expected to have lower bankruptcy rates.   
Descriptive statistics and sources for all continuous variables used in the analysis are 
shown in Table 1.  It is interesting to note that the average per capita bankruptcy rate is 0.005, 
or about five in 1,000 people.  The average per capita casino visits is 0.4127, indicating that 
states average approximately one casino resort visit for every 2.5 people.  Average per capita 
visits to Mississippi is roughly one in five people, whereas per capita visits to Nevada and New 
Jersey average one in 6.5 people and one in 17 people, respectively. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
IV.   Empirical Model and Results 
  The basic model used to estimate the influence that visits to destination casino resorts 
have on personal bankruptcy filings is: 
                                                 
11 The level of debt is an important determinant of bankruptcy.  Data on debt, however, are only publicly available 
at the national level.  Moreover, changes in debt levels are likely to be more important in explaining changes in 
bankruptcy over time as opposed to across states or regions, where less variation is likely.  We estimate models 
with both state and regional dummy variables to account for state and regional specific effects such as debt.  
12 We also considered average job tenure in our empirical models.  This variable was insignificant in all 
specifications and lowered the adjusted R
2. A year dummy variable was also considered, but this variable was 
insignificant. 
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  BANKPCj,t is the per capita bankruptcy rate for state j in year t, where t = 2001, 2002.  
PCVISITj,t is the number of visitors from state j in year t to resort casinos in Nevada, 
Mississippi, and New Jersey, examined both in aggregate (i.e., all three destinations combined) 
and individually.  CASREVj,t is total casino revenue in state j in year t.  UNEMPj,t, DIVj,t, and 
HLTHCOVj,t are the unemployment rate, divorce rate, and percent of the population with health 
coverage, respectively, for state j in year t.   
  The remaining variables control for state and regional effects.  Regional dummy 
variables based on Bureau of Economic Analysis definitions are included.
13  Separate dummy 
variables for Nevada, Mississippi, and New Jersey are included to compare bankruptcy rates of 
these states with the bankruptcy rates in other states in the region and nationally.  According to 
Eadington (1998), local casino gambling can have ambiguous effects on local personal 
bankruptcies.  The large presence of casinos in these states may lead to increases in income and 
employment that are sufficient to reduce the incidence of bankruptcy.  Alternatively, the greater 
presence of casinos, particularly for Nevada where gambling is very widespread, may lead to 
higher bankruptcy rates.  The net result depends upon which of these two effects is greater.
  Four specifications of equation (1) are estimated and the results are shown in Table 2.  
The first three specifications are estimated by OLS.  As a test for robustness, the fourth 
specification considers state-level random effects and was estimated by GLS.
14  As seen in 
Table 2, the estimates from the random effects model are very similar to the OLS results.  
                                                 
13 The Northeast region is omitted in all regressions. 
14 The Hausman test statistic for testing fixed versus random effects was 7.84, less than the χ
2 five percent critical 
value of 12.59.  We do not include state fixed effects because we wish to see how bankruptcy rates in casino resort 
state compare to other states in the respective region.  The inclusion of regional dummies and state fixed effects 
  11In all model specifications, the per capita visits variable is positive and significant at 
one percent, indicating that states with higher per capita visits to casino resorts have higher 
bankruptcy rates.  This supports the hypothesis that some of the ill effects of casino gambling, 
bankruptcy in this case, are exported back to the states where tourists reside.  Averaging the 
PCVISIT coefficients across the specifications, we find that visits to casino resorts increase 
other states’ personal bankruptcy filings by approximately five per 10,000 residents (0.0012 · 
0.4127).  This is equal to an increase of 0.5 bankruptcies per 1,000 people.  Since per capita 
bankruptcies average five per 1,000 residents (from Table 1), visits to casino resorts increase 
state per capita bankruptcies by roughly 10 percent on average.  
[Table 2 about here] 
  The remaining coefficient estimates are generally consistent with our expectations and 
consistent across model specification.  Higher rates of unemployment and divorce are 
associated with increased bankruptcy, whereas higher income lowers bankruptcy.
15  Health 
coverage is not statistically significant in most specifications, possibly due to the low variation 
of this variable across the states.
16   
As is consistent with the literature on gambling and bankruptcy, the influence of casino 
gambling on bankruptcy is mixed, but always very small.  For example, in column (1) of Table 
2, casino gambling is found to have a small positive, but statistically significant impact on 
                                                                                                                                                           
results in perfect collinearity.  The average of state fixed effects is captured by the regional dummies.  Since we 
only have two years of data for each state, the inclusion of state fixed effects significantly reduces our degrees of 
freedom.  As mentioned in the text, the results from our OLS models with regional dummies and casino resort 
state dummies are very similar to the results from the random effects model. 
15 In our specification we use contemporaneous income, unemployment, and divorce.  Using lagged values of 
these variables did not change any of our conclusions. 
16 We do find that health coverage is positive and significant at 10 percent in the third specification.  One 
explanation for this counter-intuitive result is that people with no access to any health coverage (private or publicly 
provided) are the most indigent segment of the population.  As a result, these individuals would have little or no 
assets to declare for bankruptcy compared to relatively more wealthy people.  Adding the square of health 
coverage in the models did not provide additional information.  In the end, making a definitive inference regarding 
health coverage is not possible given that the coefficient is far from robust across our various specifications. 
  12bankruptcy (about 1.5 bankruptcies per 10,000 residents at the mean).  However, when 
controlling for casino resort state and regional effects, the casino revenue variable is either no 
longer significant (column 2) or it is negative and significant at 10 percent (column 3).   A 
scatter plot of the raw casino revenue data and per capita bankruptcy data, shown in Figure 2, 
can explain the change in the sign and significance of the casino revenue coefficient across 
specifications.  Figure 2 reveals a large ‘Nevada effect’ - the two outlying points in the scatter 
plot are Nevada in 2001 and 2002.  Thus, once we control for Nevada in our empirical models, 
the relationship between casino revenue and per capita bankruptcies is no longer positive and 
statistically significant. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
  The results from the regressions that include casino resort state dummies are reported in 
column (2) and column (3) of Table 2.  The results indicate that both Mississippi and New 
Jersey have a higher incidence of bankruptcy than other states even when controlling for the 
presence of casino gambling and other economic and demographic factors.  Moreover, although 
only significant at 10 percent in the second specification, the coefficient for Nevada reveals that 
per capita bankruptcy rates in that state are nearly twice the national average.  Various pairwise 
t-tests of the three casino state coefficients reveal that most differences in the estimated 
coefficients are not statistically significant.  Only Nevada is statistically larger (at α = 0.05) 
than New Jersey in the third specification. 
Regional dummy variables are included in the third specification of Table 2.  The 
Midwest, South, and West all have higher bankruptcy rates than the Northeast.  The casino 
resort states have higher bankruptcy rates than their regional peers as indicated by the 
magnitude and significance of the casino resort state coefficients.  Here again the magnitude of 
  13the coefficient on Nevada stands out, showing the high level of bankruptcy in that state even 
when controlling for the presence of gambling.  Pairwise t-tests reveal that average per capita 
bankruptcies in Nevada are statistically greater than the average rate of bankruptcy in western 
states (at α = 0.10) and average per capita bankruptcies in New Jersey are statistically greater 
than the average rate of bankruptcy in northeastern states (at α = 0.05).   
  The results from regressions that disaggregate per capita visits by casino resort state are 
presented in Table 3.  Many of the results are consistent with those presented in Table 2.  
However, after disaggregating the per capita visits variable, only visits to Mississippi casinos 
have a statistically significant influence on per capita bankruptcies, although an F-test rejects 
the null hypothesis that all three coefficients are jointly equal to zero.  Based on the mean per 
capita visits to Mississippi reported in Table 1 and the estimated per capita visits coefficient of 
0.0016, bankruptcies nationwide are predicted to be 0.00032 (0.0016 · 0.2004), or 3.2 per 
10,000 people greater as a result of visits to Mississippi casinos.   
[Table 3 about here] 
One explanation for the statistical significance of Mississippi relative to New Jersey and 
Nevada is the different demographic makeup of the tourists that each destination attracts.  In 
particular, even though we are controlling for income, unemployment, divorce, etc., the fact 
remains that Mississippi is a regional destination, drawing most of its tourists from the South.  
According to statistics from the Mississippi Gaming Commission, during the fourth quarter of 
2002, most tourists to Mississippi casinos arrived from Tennessee (12.6 percent), Alabama 
(10.0 percent), Florida (9.9 percent), Arkansas (9.7 percent) and Louisiana (9.2 percent).  
Tourists to Mississippi casinos are therefore predominantly from a region with lower income 
and consequently may be more susceptible to bankruptcy-inducing economic shocks, i.e., large 
  14gambling losses, than tourists to either Atlantic City, which draws primarily from the wealthier 
Northeast, or Nevada, where Las Vegas attracts tourists both nationally and worldwide. 
  As further evidence of this, consider the additional comparison of the three casino resort 
destinations:  Atlantic City and Mississippi are very similar destinations in that both are 
primarily regional destinations.  Atlantic City had just over 33 million visitors in 2002 with 
24.6 million, or roughly 75 percent, arriving by automobile.  Mississippi had over 54 million 
visitors in 2002, and of these, over 23 million visited the coastal region of Gulfport/Biloxi.  
According to the Gulfport/Biloxi Regional Airport Authority, however, there were only 
816,653 boardings at the airport, so most visitors clearly arrived by automobile.  In contrast to 
both Mississippi and Atlantic City, however, Las Vegas had roughly 35 million visitors in both 
2001 and 2002.  Approximately 6 million (17 percent) visitors arrived by car from Southern 
California, whereas McCarran International Airport had 35 million enplaned/deplaned 
passengers.
17  Finally, although Las Vegas and Atlantic City each attracted approximately 35 
million visitors in 2002, total casino gambling revenue for Las Vegas was $7.63 billion versus 
$4.38 billion in Atlantic City.  Mississippi, in contrast, had more visitors, nearly 55 million, but 
only amassed $3.37 billion in gaming revenue, thus suggesting much less affluent visitors more 
prone to bankruptcy than gamblers traveling to either Las Vegas or Atlantic City. 
    Consistent with Barron et al. (2002) and Thalheimer (2004), the influence of 
Mississippi casinos nationwide is very small and localized.  As presented earlier, bankruptcies 
nationwide are predicted to be 3.2 per 10,000 people greater as a result of Mississippi casinos.  
However, the average per capita visits for the states surrounding Mississippi (Tennessee, 
                                                 
17 Not all enplaned/deplaned passengers will have Las Vegas as a final destination.  Data for Las Vegas are from 
http://www.lasvegas24hours.com/pdf/historical_visitor_statistics.pdf.  Atlantic City data are from 
http://www.atlanticcitynj.com/resources_research.asp.  Information for Mississippi is from www.gulfcoast.org/gpt 
and from quarterly reports prepared by the Mississippi Gaming Commission http://www.mgc.state.ms.us/.  
 
  15Alabama, Florida, Arkansas, and Louisiana) is 1.544 (compared to the national average of 
0.4127), suggesting an increase of 0.0024 (0.0016 · 1.544), or 2.4 bankruptcies per 1,000 
people.  Thus, in this case the regional influence of casino gambling on bankruptcy is much 
greater than the nationwide influence. 
 
V.  Summary and Conclusions 
  Casino gambling in the United States has spread from just two states (Nevada and New 
Jersey) in the early 1990s to over thirty states by 2005.  During this period, much has been 
written about the positive and negative aspects of this expansion.  Indeed, the growth in casino 
gambling even led to a federal government inquiry into the consequences of expanded 
gambling (National Gambling Impact Study Commission, 1999).  Due in large part to work by 
Eadington (1998, 1999), it is generally agreed that destination resort casinos provide the 
greatest economic benefit by “exporting” casino gambling, i.e., attracting tourists and bringing 
in dollars from outside of the community.   
However, there is less agreement on the negative aspects of gambling, as demonstrated 
by the mixed findings in the literature regarding the link between gambling and bankruptcy.  
Moreover, all previous studies on this issue only examined the influence of local casinos on 
local bankruptcy filings.  Less is known about the negative influence that destination casino 
resorts have on communities where tourists reside.  This paper used data on the number of 
gambler visits to resort casinos in Nevada, New Jersey, and Mississippi from all other states, 
and has demonstrated that destination casino resorts do indeed “export” bankruptcy along with 
gambling services.   
  16  This negative influence is not uniform across the three destinations studied here.  In 
particular, only visits to Mississippi resort casinos are found to have a statistically significant 
influence on bankruptcy filings in other states.  Consistent with other studies, this influence is 
greatest in the region that Mississippi heavily draws from (roughly 2.4 bankruptcies per 1,000 
people), while the nationwide impact is small (roughly 3 bankruptcies per 10,000 people).   
  The finding that the influence of casino resorts on personal bankruptcy filings is not 
uniform across all jurisdictions has important policy implications with regard to the future 
expansion of casino gambling.  In particular, it was noted earlier in the paper that the 
characteristics of visitors to the various resorts are quite different.  While Atlantic City, Reno 
and Laughlin, Nevada, and Mississippi are all regional resorts, they draw from very different 
regions.  Atlantic City draws from the wealthier Northeast, Reno and Laughlin attract 
approximately 40% of their gamblers from California, while Mississippi draws from the less 
wealthy South and Southeast.
18  Indeed, Atlantic City has higher gambling revenue despite 
having fewer visitors.  Las Vegas has approximately the same number of visitors as Atlantic 
City, but has nearly twice the gambling revenue, suggesting an even more affluent gambler.  
Negative income shocks, such as gambling losses, are therefore likely to be more easily 
absorbed by gamblers frequenting Atlantic City or Las Vegas compared to gamblers that 
frequent Mississippi resort casinos.  This suggests that the location of a casino destination 
resort is an important factor in determining its cost-benefit ratio.  Casino resorts placed in 
wealthier regions are less likely to significantly export bankruptcy. 
                                                 
18 Reno and Laughlin are a small part of Nevada’s casino gaming industry, so Nevada’s influence on other states’ 
bankruptcy rates will predominantly reflect casinos in Las Vegas.  In 2003, gaming revenues in Nevada totaled 
$9.6 billion.  Revenues for Washoe County, which includes Reno and North Lake Tahoe, were $1 billion, whereas 
Laughlin revenues totaled $552 million.  In contrast, revenues for the “Las Vegas Strip” were $4.8 billion.  
Excluding Laughlin, Clark County (city of Las Vegas) accounted for 76 percent ($7.3 billion) of Nevada’s total 
gaming revenue.  Statistics from Nevada Gaming Control Board, http://gaming.nv.gov/documents/pdf/cyrr03.pdf.  
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Source: The Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/bankruptcystats.htm 
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Per Capita Bankruptcy  0.0049 
(0.0017) 
 
Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts 
Casino Revenue (millions)  858.9403 
(1,593.10) 
Meister (2005) for Native 
American revenue; state gaming 
agencies for commercial casino 
gaming revenue 
 




2002 and 2003 Harrahs Survey 
and Mississippi Gaming 
Commission.  See text for 
computations. 
 






2002 and 2003 Harrahs Survey 
and the Las Vegas Convention 
and Visitors Authority. See text 
for computations. 
 
Per Capita Visits to 




2002 and 2003 Harrahs Survey.  
See text for computations. 
 





2002 and 2003 Harrahs Survey 
and Mississippi Gaming 
Commission.  See text for 
computations. 
 
Per Capita Income  28,567.25 
(4,234.97) 
 
U.S Bureau of the Census 
Unemployment Rate  4.9229 
(1.0185) 
 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Divorce Rate (per 1,000)  4.1222 
(1.0760) 
 
U.S. National Center for Health 
Statistics, Vital Statistics of the 
United States, annual. 
Health Insurance Coverage  0.8558 
(0.0369) 
 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
Current Population Survey.  
Annual Social and Economic 
Supplements. 
Note:  data are at the state-level for 2001 and 2002.  Number of observations = 96. 
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Table 2 – Casino Gaming and Non-Business Bankruptcies 
 















































































Midwest -------  -------  0.0018*** 
(5.63) 
------- 
South -------  -------  0.0020*** 
(4.59) 
------- 




2 0.408 0.429 0.525 ------- 
Note:  Dependent variable is per capita non-business bankruptcies.  Absolute t-statistics in parentheses.  *** denotes 
significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent.  Casino revenue is in million of dollars.   Northeast is the omitted 
region.  Specifications (1) through (3) are estimated by OLS, specification (4) considers state random effects estimated by GLS.  
Number of observations = 96. 
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Table 3 – Casino Gaming and Non-Business Bankruptcies – By Resort State 
 































































































Midwest -------  -------  0.0016*** 
(4.97) 
------- 
South -------  -------  0.0019*** 
(4.53) 
------- 




2 0.417 0.443 0.523 ------- 
Note:  Dependent variable is per capita non-business bankruptcies.  Absolute t-statistics in parentheses.  *** denotes 
significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent.  Casino revenue is in million of dollars.   Northeast is the 
omitted region.  Specifications (1) through (3) are estimated by OLS, specification (4) considers state random effects 
estimated by GLS.  Number of observations = 96. 
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